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In the private sectors, the returns to education increase from 0-2 per cent in the late 
1980s and early 1990s to about 4 per cent in 1997, while those of public sectors do not 
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switching model, but the main results remain unchanged. 
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This paper examines the wage determinants of state-owned, collective-owned, and 
private sectors in China from 1989 to 1997. Specifically, we estimate the returns to 
education in different ownership sectors. Education, as a major form of human capital, 
plays an essential role in enhancing labour’s productivity and therefore increasing 
income, as proclaimed by human capital theory (e.g., Schultz 1961; Becker 1993). 
Empirically, returns to education are extensively studied around the world, and return 
rates are generally high (see, for example, Psacharopoulos 1994; Card 1999; Duflo 
2001).1 The literature on China’s returns to education is also growing rapidly, and due to 
dualism, the return rates in rural and urban areas are usually estimated separately. The 
basic findings on returns to education in the urban areas indicate that these rates were 
lower than those of other countries in the 1980s and early 1990s and have been 
increasing ever since. Zhang et al. (2005), for example, estimate the returns to schooling 
in urban China from 1988 to 2001, and find a robust trend of increasing returns to 
education.2 There are also increasing trends in the rural areas (Zhang, Huang and 
Rozelle 2002, for example). Broadly speaking, however, the results for rural China are 
more diverse than those of urban area.3,4 This article is a part of the growing literature 
seeking to assess the evolution of returns to education on the Chinese labour market. It 
contributes to the existing literature by estimating the return rates of different 
ownerships.  
In the 1990s, China experienced far-reaching transition, and the coexistence of different 
ownerships was one prominent feature of this process. The role of private economy as 
an important complementary part of the whole economy was established by the   
14th CCP congress, and subsequently private sectors enlarged vibrantly. Because of 
China’s institutional divergence and labour market segmentation, several questions need 
to be answered: Do public and private sectors have the same level of human capital? Is 
human capital equally compensated? To what extents are these caused by labour’s self-
selection, given that the returns are different?  
Articles closely related to these questions include Zhao (2002) and Dong and Bowles 
(2002). Zhao’s (2002) results indicate that in 1996, returns to education in foreign 
                                                 
1  In Psacharopoulos’ (1994) survey, the world average return to education is about 10 per cent and 9.6 
per cent in Asia. A more recent research (Duflo 2001) on Indonesia finds that the return to education 
is about 6~10 per cent, after coping with endogeneity problem. As for health, Duncan and Strauss’s 
(1997) research on Brazil shows a significant effect of health and nutrition on wages. For a more 
recent survey on the return to education in developed countries, see Card (1999). 
2   Related literature includes Appleton, Song and Xia (2005); Maurer-Fazio (1999); Johnson and Chow 
(1997) and Liu (1998). 
3   de Brauw et al. (2002) provide a comprehensive survey on rural return to education. 
4   See, for example, Meng (1996, 2000); Zhang, Huang and Rozelle (2002); Parish, Zhe and Li (1995) 
and Wei (2004). Meng (1996, 2000) finds that non-market factors, instead of human capital, play 
major roles in wage determination. Research by Zhang, Huang and Rozelle (2002) indicates that 
during the period between late 1980 to mid 1990s, return to education increase, from insignificant 
rates in 1988 to 6~10 per cent in 1996. Wei (2004) analyses the effects of both education and health, 
and finds that the return to education is insignificant in 1993, even after addressing the selection 
problem. As for rural regions, de Brauw et al.’s survey indicates that the return to education is about 
0~6 per cent.  
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invested enterprises are higher than those of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), urban 
collective enterprises and domestic private enterprises. Dong and Bowles (2002), using 
survey data from Dalian and Xiamen, analyse the wage-setting behaviour of four types 
of enterprises: (i) state-owned enterprises, (ii) township and village enterprises, 
(iii)  joint ventures, and (iv)  foreign-invested firms in China’s light consumer goods 
industry in 1998. They find no significant difference in the returns to education among 
the four types of firms. Taking the potential non-random problem into consideration, 
both articles use Heckman’s two-step method to correct selection bias.5  
This paper contributes to this branch of literature by examining another dataset, which is 
more representative of China’s labour market and covers a longer period. Using China’s 
Household Nutrition Survey (CHNS), we find that the returns to education are around  
0-2 per cent in the early 1990s in all sectors, for both rural and urban regions. The case 
is different in 1997, and the returns to education range between 4.5-4.8 per cent in the 
private sectors while those of other sectors remain low. These results indicate that 
different sectors have different compensation mechanisms and that the labour market is 
segmented. We also correct for possible selection bias with a two-step switching 
model,6 which can be used to estimate wage equations for more than two categories 
simultaneously.  
In the next section, using the CHNS, we show the patterns of human capital and wage 
distribution in the different sectors. The econometric results of OLS are presented in 
section 3; selection bias and the rural-urban divide are addressed in section 4. Section 5, 
using the multinomial logit regression, analyses the role of human capital in sector 
choice. Section 6 concludes. 
2  Data and model specification 
2.1 Data  description 
The data come from CHNS, conducted by an international team of experts on nutrition, 
public health, economics, sociology, Chinese studies, and demography. The survey 
covers about 16,000 individuals from more than 3,000 households in nine provinces 
including Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, 
and Guizhou.7 These provinces vary greatly in terms of geography and economic 
performance, and thus CHNS can be regarded as representative of China. This paper 
uses four waves of this dataset, namely 1989, 1991, 1993 and 1997.  
                                                 
5  Other papers (Chen, Demurger and Fournier 2005; Zhao 2001) also investigate wage determination or 
wage structure of different ownerships.  
6  Switching model is increasingly used by researchers. With this model Lee (1978) analyses wage 
mechanisms between union and non-union sectors; Trost (1977) analyses the difference in expenditure 
behavior of home owners and renters. Robinson and Tomes (1984) examine the wage differential 
between public and non-public sectors. With regard to multi-choice models, Hay (1980) analyses the 
occupation choice decision, Dong and Bowels (2002) review the wage mechanisms for different kinds 
of firms, but due paucity of data, they confine their research to two types of firms in using Heckman’s 
two stage model. 
7  In 1997, Heilongjiang replaced Liaoning.  
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Because we focus on wage determination, only individuals with wage income are 
included. The remaining sample is then divided into four subsets according to the 
survey’s ownership categories: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), small collective 
enterprises (SCEs), large collective enterprises (LCEs), and the private sector (PRI).8 
Table 1 reports the labour shares of different ownerships from 1989 to 1997. In the rural 
regions, private sectors account for a considerable fraction of the labourforce, and this 
increases slightly from 23 per cent in 1989 to 26 per cent in 1997. In urban areas, public 
sectors dominate from 1989 to 1997, with the state-owned sector taking 60-70 per cent 
of the labour force. The share of private sector increases, however, from 5 per cent in 
1989 to 12 per cent in 1997.9  
Table 2 reports summary statistics. As for years of schooling (also depicted in Figure 1), 
several points need to be mentioned. First, the education level is the highest in SOEs 
from 1989 to 1997. Taking the 1991 as an example, the descending sequence is SOEs, 
LCEs, SCEs, and PRI in the rural regions, with the average education levels being 9.0, 
7.5, 7.3, and 7.1 years. The case of the urban areas is different, with the SCEs and PRI 
reversing their position after 1991. Second, except for the SCE sectors, education levels 
in all sectors are higher in the urban areas than in the rural. Third, education levels 
increase in all sectors during this period. Another form of human capital is health, for 
which height is an indicator (e.g., Duncan and Strauss 1997). Height is invariably higher 
in the SOEs than in other sectors (depicted in Figure 2). Table 2 also reports the hours 
worked per day. Daily working hours in the SOEs tend to be less than those in other 
ownership firms.  
Table 1 
Labour shares of different ownerships 
 1989  1991  1993    1997 
Type of work unit  Persons  %  Persons %  Persons %    Persons  % 
 Rural 
State owned (SOEs)  478  35.83   504  35.07   450  33.28   586  40.89 
Small collective (SCEs)  404  30.28    396 27.56    377 27.88    311 21.7 
Large collective (LCEs)  145  10.87    184 12.8    211 15.61    164 11.44 
Private (PRI)  307  23.01    353 24.57    314 23.22    372 25.96 
Total 1,334  100.00    1,437 100.00    1,352 100.00    1,433 100.00 
 Urban 
State owned (SOEs)  1,294  64.22   1,185 66.05    919 65.83    809 60.87 
Small collective (SCEs)  246  12.21    212 11.82    143 10.24    169 12.72 
Large collective (LCEs)  373  18.51    320 17.84    255 18.27    195 14.67 
Private (PRI)  102  5.06    77 4.29    79 5.66    156 11.74 
Total 2,015  100.00    1,794 100.00    1,396 100.00    1,329 100.00 
Source:  Compiled by the author, based on data from CHNS. 
                                                 
8  The classification of SOEs, SCEs and LCEs is consistent in the survey from 1989 to 1997. While 
‘private’ is the only category remaining in 1989, it is further subdivided into ‘private or individual’ 
and ‘joint venture’ or ‘three capital’. For consistency, this paper still treats these subgroups as private 
sector. 
9  If Heilongjian had not replaced Liaoning in 1997, the labour share in the private sector would have 
been higher than reported in Table 1, because the SOEs have a greater labour share in Heilongjiang. In 
1996 in Heilongjiang and Liaoning, the labour shares in SOEs are 39 per cent and 33 per cent, 
respectively (NBS 1997: Tables 4-3 and 4-10).   
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Although public sectors, especially SOEs, are at an advantage in terms of human capital 
level, their wage levels are low compared to the private sectors. Take the rural sample 
for 1991, for example, hourly wages are 0.5, 0.6, 0.5, and 1.1 yuan in the SOEs, SCEs, 
LCEs, and PRI. With the exception of 1989, the standard errors of hourly wages are 
larger for the private sector than for other ownerships. Table 3 also calculates the 10 per 
cent, 25 per cent, 50 per cent, 75 per cent, and 90 per cent percentiles of the wages for 
various ownerships. It is obvious that wages in the private sectors show greater 
dispersion than in other sectors. In the rural areas, the wage level in 1991 is around 0.3 
yuan/hour at the 10 per cent percentile level in all sectors; at the 90 per cent percentile 
level, however, wage level in the private sectors is about 1.9 yuan/hour, i.e., 2.5, 1.9, 
and 2.5 times that of SOEs, SCEs, and LCEs, respectively. The patterns in the urban 
area and for other survey years are similar.  
Table 2 
Summary statistics 
  SOEs  SCEs  LCEs    PRI 
   Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e. Mean s.e.
1989 Hourly  wage  (yuan)  1.1 2.3 0.7 1.4 0.6 1.1 1.1 1.6
  Working hours per day  7.9 0.8 8.0 1.5 8.1 0.9 7.6 2.6
 Schooling  (yrs)  8.7 3.8 7.3 3.5 7.5 3.1 6.5 3.1
 Height  (cm)  165.1 7.8 163.2 7.4 163.8 7.6 163.3 6.8
 Age  35.8 11.9 31.9 11.0 32.3 10.6 34.1 12.0
1991 Hourly  wage  (yuan)  0.5 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.2 1.1 2.0
  Working hours per day  8.0 0.8 8.2 1.1 8.1 0.8 8.0 2.5
 Schooling  (yrs)  9.0 3.5 7.3 3.3 7.5 2.9 7.1 3.1
 Height  (cm)  163.6 10.8 162.3 7.2 162.8 10.5 161.7 11.3
 Age  34.1 11.0 33.3 11.2 32.9 10.7 32.1 11.6
1993 Hourly  wage  (yuan)  0.7 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.5 1.4 1.8
  Working hours per day  7.9 0.9 8.1 2.9 8.6 5.2 8.2 3.9
 Schooling  (yrs)  9.1 3.6 7.6 3.1 7.7 2.6 7.0 2.8
 Height  (cm)  164.5 8.1 162.8 7.6 161.6 7.4 162.3 7.3
 Age  35.6 11.2 34.3 11.2 32.1 11.4 33.3 11.4
1997 Hourly  wage  (yuan)  1.0 0.6 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4
  Working hours per day  7.7 1.0 7.9 1.5 8.0 1.7 8.5 1.8
 Schooling  (yrs)  10.3 2.5 8.2 2.7 9.1 2.8 8.0 3.0
 Age  36.2 10.4 39.3 10.5 35.8 10.5 35.9 13.0
   Urban 
1989 Hourly  wage  (yuan)  0.6 1.3 0.6 1.3 0.7 1.8 0.7 0.7
  Working hours per day  7.9 1.0 8.0 1.5 8.0 1.2 8.3 2.2
 Schooling  (yrs)  9.5 3.6 6.9 3.5 8.0 3.2 6.7 3.4
 Height  (cm)  162.9 8.0 162.2 8.4 162.0 7.6 160.4 7.4
 Age  36.1 12.1 35.5 12.5 35.2 12.4 35.5 15.1
1991 Hourly  wage  (yuan)  0.5 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.5
  Working hours per day  7.9 0.7 8.2 1.2 7.9 0.9 8.2 1.9
 Schooling  (yrs)  9.9 3.2 7.1 3.2 8.3 3.0 7.5 3.4
 Height  (cm)  163.5 8.7 162.1 7.5 161.6 12.0 161.0 7.5
 Age  35.8 11.2 36.5 11.7 33.4 11.3 37.1 12.8
1993 Hourly  wage  (yuan)  0.7 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.7 2.1 2.7 10.8
  Working hours per day  7.9 2.0 8.4 2.2 7.7 1.1 8.1 2.1
 Schooling  (yrs)  9.9 3.3 7.2 3.1 8.5 2.8 7.9 3.3
 Height  (cm)  163.4 9.6 162.2 14.6 163.0 8.1 162.0 7.7
 Age  37.5 10.9 37.5 10.4 34.4 10.6 35.6 12.1
1997 Hourly  wage  (yuan)  1.1 0.6 1.3 1.6 1.0 0.4 1.5 1.5
  Working hours per day  7.8 0.9 7.7 1.8 8.0 0.8 8.7 2.0
 Schooling  (yrs)  10.9 3.0 8.2 3.3 9.7 2.8 9.0 3.1
 Age  37.5 10.3 38.8 11.4 36.4 9.7 34.2 11.0
Source:  Compiled by the author, based on data from CHNS.  
5 
Table 3 
Wage distribution (unit: yuan) 
 Rural  Urban 
  SOEs SCEs LCEs  PRI  SOEs SCEs LCEs  PRI 
 1989 
10% 0.281  0.222  0.264  0.274   0.238  0.173  0.208  0.233 
25% 0.352  0.308  0.305  0.412   0.295  0.257  0.259  0.280 
50% 0.472  0.453  0.382  0.611   0.381  0.367  0.343  0.467 
75% 0.625  0.622  0.486  0.977   0.513  0.490  0.431  0.707 
90% 0.918  1.070  0.686  1.946   0.674  0.881  0.582  1.167 
 1991 
10% 0.310  0.253  0.299  0.307   0.285  0.211  0.259  0.344 
25% 0.377  0.350  0.368  0.446   0.354  0.305  0.315  0.431 
50% 0.481  0.499  0.453  0.708   0.450  0.416  0.395  0.629 
75% 0.610  0.724  0.577  1.152   0.566  0.567  0.503  0.922 
90% 0.774  0.993  0.760  1.900   0.701  0.834  0.629  1.391 
 1993 
10% 0.352  0.342  0.345  0.406   0.318  0.231  0.282  0.446 
25% 0.444  0.503  0.478  0.635   0.391  0.446  0.346  0.528 
50% 0.576  0.703  0.712  1.005   0.514  0.641  0.492  0.957 
75% 0.822  0.919  0.936  1.645   0.717  0.867  0.664  1.760 
90% 1.070  1.319  1.260  2.865   0.967  1.190  0.970  2.733 
 1997 
10% 0.424  0.402  0.438  0.552   0.505  0.536  0.498  0.528 
25% 0.618  0.591  0.613  0.721   0.707  0.693  0.661  0.711 
50% 0.873  0.804  0.901  1.047   1.010  0.932  0.892  1.113 
75% 1.192  1.308  1.348  1.495   1.398  1.334  1.186  1.620 
90% 1.555  1.864  1.957  2.157   1.848  2.097  1.448  2.386 
Source:  Compiled by the author, based on data from CHNS. 
Figure 1 
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Source: Computed by the author, based on data from CHNS. 
 
The patterns of wage distribution may be partly related to the definition of wages, as 
bonuses and subsidies are excluded in the questionnaire. This makes it hard to compare 
the results of this paper to others.10 However, because wages constitute the most 
important part of one’s income, and bonuses and subsidies may be subject to factors 
                                                 
10 For example, Zhang et al. (2005), and the literature mentioned therein.  
6 
such as wage regulations, employer’s profitability, and economic fluctuations, our 
discussion in this paper is confined to pure wages. 
Figure 2 

























RURAL REGIONS  URBAN REGIONS 
Source: Computed by the author, based on data from CHNS. 
2.2 Model  specification 
The model we estimate is an extended Mincer (1974) equation: 
12 ln( ) sis i s s i s s i wage H X u ββ =++ ，  （1） 
Where s refers to different sectors with s=1,2,3,4 representing SOEs, SCEs, LCEs, and 
PRI, respectively; H  is human capital vector, which may include education, health, 
experience and experience square. We use the years of formal schooling and height as 
proxies of education and health, respectively.11 Experience is calculated according to 
Mincer (1974): experience= -(    )-6 age years of schooling . In addition, X controls for 
such non-market factors such as gender, province dummies, occupation and constant; 
(, ) 0 sss Eu H X = , ln( )si wage  is the log form of observation i’s wage, which can be 
observed only when individual i is in the sector s (selection bias is discussed later). We 
estimate wage equations separately for each sector and year to allow the returns to 
education to differ. One alternative method is to include interaction terms in one setting 
instead of estimating them separately. Although using only one equation seems to be more 
efficient than separate estimations, both are essentially the same. in order to be consistent 
with the switching model in section 4, we estimate the wage equation by sectors. 
In the remaining sector, we estimate the wage equations by year rather than pooling 
different years (so that individual fixed effects can be controlled for). On the one hand, 
the sample changes considerably, especially in 1997, when Liaoning was replaced by 
Heilongjiang province. On the other hand, as education itself is time invariant, we can at 
most estimate the return differentials between various years by interacting education 
with year dummies. Furthermore, fixed effects model makes it difficult to correct for 
selectivity bias.  
                                                 
11 Height is widely used as a proxy for health, see, for example, Duncan and Strauss (1997); Strauss and 
Duncan (1998), and Fogel (1994).  
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3 OLS  results 
3.1 Pooling  results 
First we assume that wage determination is identical in all sectors, and this allows us to 
run a pooling regression. We just control the ownership dummies to see their effects on 
wages. The results are presented in Table 4. When the ownership dummies are not 
controlled, the adjusted r-squares are around 13.4 per cent, 24.5 per cent, 16.5 per cent 
and 15.8 per cent in 1989, 1991, 1993, and 1997, respectively. The adjusted r-squares 
increased by 2.2, 1.7, 6.1, and 1.6 percentage points when they are included. The results 
also indicate that differences in the wage levels exist mainly between the private and  
 
Table 4 
Wage equation (pooling results) 
Dependent variable=log (hour wage) 
  1989 1991 1993    1997 
  1 2  3 4  5 6    7 8 
Schooling  0.011  0.014**  0.015*** 0.016***  0.016*** 0.023***  0.013**  0.013** 
  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) 
Experience  0.022*** 0.023***  0.026*** 0.026***  0.028*** 0.028***  0.027*** 0.030*** 
  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004) 
Experience square/100  -0.015  -0.015  -0.030*** -0.031***  -0.037*** -0.035***  -0.048*** -0.052*** 
  (0.021) (0.020)  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Ln(height)  0.135 0.261  0.244 0.277  0.666**  0.622**     
  (0.214) (0.212)  (0.205) (0.203)  (0.284) (0.273)     
Female  -0.095*** -0.085**  -0.120*** -0.121***  -0.092*** -0.081***  -0.155*** -0.155*** 
Liaoning (‘89, ‘91, ‘93)  
or Heilongjiang (‘97) omitted       
 
  
  (0.036) (0.035)  (0.022) (0.022)  (0.031) (0.030)  (0.023) (0.023) 
Jiangsu  -0.103* -0.141***  -0.059* -0.077**  0.120***  0.047  0.310***  0.320*** 
  (0.054) (0.055)  (0.030) (0.031)  (0.043) (0.043)  (0.049) (0.049) 
Shandong  0.157**  0.127*  0.000 -0.011  0.126***  0.115** 0.141**  0.167*** 
  (0.064) (0.067)  (0.032) (0.032)  (0.048) (0.047)  (0.055) (0.056) 
Henan  0.139**  0.082 0.065*  0.055  -0.026  -0.067 0.186***  0.194*** 
  (0.064) (0.064)  (0.039) (0.039)  (0.054) (0.052)  (0.056) (0.056) 
Hubei  0.053  0.021  0.126*** 0.116***  0.087*  0.077*  0.196*** 0.213*** 
  (0.058) (0.058)  (0.033) (0.033)  (0.046) (0.045)  (0.052) (0.052) 
Hunan  0.273*** 0.219***  0.123*** 0.097***  0.282*** 0.241***  0.458*** 0.442*** 
  (0.059) (0.059)  (0.033) (0.032)  (0.047) (0.045)  (0.054) (0.054) 
Guangxi  -0.013 -0.051  -0.056 -0.080** 0.137***  0.071  0.108**  0.093* 
  (0.072) (0.071)  (0.036) (0.036)  (0.049) (0.047)  (0.053) (0.052) 
Guizhou  0.094  0.055  -0.071*  -0.073*  0.094* 0.045  0.098* 0.101* 
  (0.066) (0.066)  (0.038) (0.038)  (0.052) (0.051)  (0.057) (0.057) 
State-owned sector omitted             
Small collective   0.075   0.050**   0.122***    -0.031 
   (0.047)   (0.025)   (0.035)   (0.041) 
Large collective    -0.003   0.003   0.073**    -0.025 
   (0.046)   (0.025)   (0.034)   (0.036) 
Private sector   0.519***   0.359***   0.657***   0.207*** 
   (0.082)   (0.046)   (0.049)   (0.044) 
R2_a  0.134 0.156  0.245 0.262  0.165 0.226    0.154 0.168 
N  1506 1506  2688 2688  2302 2302    2233 2233 
Note:    Occupation, urban dummy are controlled. *significant at 10% level, **significant 5% level, 
***significant at 1% level. Standard errors in parenthesis, constant not reported.  
 
Table 5  
 Wage equations of different sectors 
Dependent variable=log (hourly wage) 
  1991 1993 1997 
  SOEs SCEs LCEs  PRI  SOEs SCEs LCEs  PRI  SOEs SCEs LCEs  PRI 
























































































(1.633)     
        
        
R2_a  0.392 0.147 0.162 0.071  0.184 0.217 0.114 0.186  0.199 0.148 0.074 0.292 
N  1437  522 433 296  1180  431 393 298  1201  383 299 350 

















































































































R2_a  0.388 0.157 0.137 0.109  0.148 0.180 0.180 0.200  0.206 0.165 0.064 0.292 
N  1080  463 345 265  953 333 307 249  1165  359 290 345 
Note:   Occupation and province dummies are controlled, *significant at 10% level, **significant 5% level, ***significant at 1% level. Standard errors in parenthesis, constant 
not reported. 





public sectors. Given other conditions, average wage levels of the private sectors are 
about 51.9 per cent, 35.9 per cent, 65.7 per cent, and 18.3 per cent higher than those of 
the SOEs. The effect of human capital on wages seems to evolve over time. The returns 
to education are 1.4 per cent, 1.6 per cent, 2.3 per cent, and 1.8 per cent, respectively, in 
1989, 1991, 1993, and 1997, all significant. The return rates are low compared to 
existing literature on China (Appleton et al. 2005: Zhang et al. 2005). One possible 
explanation is that our wage data differ from most used the literature, as mentioned in 
section 2. Health (for which height is a proxy) is also positively related to wages. 
Labourers who are taller tend to earn more wages, but the effects are significant only in 
1993. 
Unproductive factors are also important in wage determination. Females earn 
significantly less than their male counterparts; wage levels also vary significantly 
between regions, which means that the labour market is geographically segmented. So 
what has happened in China’s labour market? Is it becoming more efficient or not? 
Using the return to education in this way to evaluate Chinese labour market may be an 
oversimplification because it applies too strong a restriction in assuming that the returns 
to education are identical in all sectors. Next we relax this restriction, and estimate the 
wage equations according to sector and year. 
3.2 Wage  determination  in  different sectors (OLS) 
The results of early 1990s 
Panel A of Table 5 reports the results of 1991, 1993, and 1997.12 In 1991, the return to 
education is the highest in SOEs among the four sectors, which is about 2 per cent and 
significant at the 1 per cent level, whereas in other sectors, it is around 1 per cent and 
none are significant. Experience, however, seems to be an important factor in 
determining wage levels in all sectors. But the patterns of wage-experience profiles are 
different between the SOEs and the private sector. For those with no experience, wage 
levels increase in the SOEs and the private sectors 2.6 per cent and 3.5 per cent, 
respectively, with one additional year of experience. Considering the term of experience 
squared, it takes workers in the private sectors about 30 years to reach the peak wage 
level. In the SOEs, however, it takes as long as 60 years, which implies that wages in 
SOEs are continually increasing during the labourer’s working life. Further, health plays 
a more significant role in the private sectors, with the wage elasticity to height being 
about 2.0 (significant at 10 per cent level). This may be related to the nature of the jobs 
in the private sector which are more strength demanding.  
The returns to education increase from 1991 to 1993 in all sectors except the LCEs, 
while the return rate in the SOEs increases to 2.3 per cent. Still, experience is an 
important factor in determining the wage levels in all sectors except LCE, and the 
patterns of wage-experience profiles are also different between sectors. For those with 
no experience, wages increase in the SOEs and private sectors 2.9 per cent and 4.6 per 
cent with one additional year of experience, respectively. Considering the terms of 
experience squared, it takes workers in the private sectors about 32 years to reach the 
peak wage level, while it takes as long as 47 years in the SOEs to achieve the peak, 
                                                 
12 The results for 1989 are dropped because the sample size of private sector is rather small.  
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which means that there is almost no increase in SOEs wages over the employees’ 
working life. But the pattern is already different for 1991. 
The above results seem to indicate an unsatisfactory labour market in the early 1990s. In 
particular, the role of education in wage determination is not significant, particularly in 
sectors other than the SOEs. The return rate in the SOEs is extremely low, which may 
indicate that their wage determination mechanisms are not fully productivity-oriented. 
Education may merely be a rigid criterion. According to Lardy (1997), the period of the 
early 1990s coincides with the end of second stage of reforms, which were initiated in 
the mid-1980s and focused on establishing responsibility between managers and the 
government. Although some research (Groves et al. 1995) indicates that the managerial 
labour market improved during this period, the above results tell different story with 
regard to the whole labour market. But we should be cautious in drawing this 
conclusion because of the wage data used here.  
Wage determination in 1997 
From 1993 onward, China’s reform entered a critical stage. In 1992, the main target of 
economic reform was ‘building socialist market economy’. Private economy was 
recognized as an important complementary part of the whole economy, and henceforth, 
private economy developed vibrantly. How does affect wage determination of the 
different ownerships?  
The most striking result is that returns to education in private sectors increase to 4.1 per 
cent (significant at the 1 per cent level), while the return rates in other sectors are only 
about 1 per cent and insignificant. Experience remains a significant factor in wage 
determination and the wage-experience profiles are concave, which conform with most 
of the existing literature. But patterns for the SOEs are different from the results for 
1991 and 1993. In 1997, it takes only about 27 years in the SOEs to achieve the peak 
level of wages.  
Thus we can draw a tentative conclusion that the returns to education increase from 
1991 to 1997 in the private sectors, while those of other sectors do not. Is the Chinese 
labour market segmented? Does the gap between public and private sectors reflect 
different wage mechanisms, which in turn are deeply rooted in the economic regime. 
Self-selection may be a serious problem if the gap is merely the result of people 
choosing different sectors.  
4  Self-selection and the rural-urban divide 
4.1  Sample selection correction of the OLS results 
Model specification of switching regression 
An individual chooses his/her work sector based on their personal attributes, which 
cannot be controlled for in the wage equation. When these unobservable 
(uncontrollable) attributes are correlated to education, the estimates may be biased. One 
possible explanation is that workers with more ability or greater entrepreneurial spirit 
choose to work in the private sectors rather than the SOEs because of the wage gap (Li 
1997). We subsequently use the switching model to correct this bias. The model is as 
follows (which is heavily borrowed from Maddala 1983).  
11 
12 ln( ) sis i s s i s s i wage H X u ββ =++ ，  （1） 
Equation (1) is exactly the same as in section 2. 
*
sis i s i Iz γ η =+   （2） 
Equation (2) is a latent decision equation, and 
*
si I is unobservable. What we can actually 
observe is I, which is a multi-value variable with I=s when an individual works in sector 
s and we have: 
I s =  if and only if 
**
s j I MaxI > , ( 1,2,3,4, j =  and  j s ≠ ), further we assume 
*
s js MaxI εη =− , ( 1, 2,3, 4, j = and j s ≠ ）so we have I s =  if and only if  s s z ε γ < . If 
we assume that  j η   have identical independent distribution, and the cumulative 
distribution function is as  ( ) exp[ exp( )] i Fc c η <= − −, we have  s ε ’s distribution 
function： 
exp( )
() P r ( )












For every wage equation of sector s, ln( ) si wage can be observed if and only if  s s z ε γ < . 
Further assume: 
()
*1 () ss s s JF εε ε
− == Φ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ 。 
So we can use OLS to estimate the following equation to obtain the returns to education 
of different sectors.  
[ ] () 12 (, ,) ( ) s s s s s ss ss ss s s s s s El w g H X z H X J z F z v εγ β β σ ρ φ γ γ <= + − +    (3) 
where,  ) var(
2
s s u = σ , s ρ  is the correlation coefficient between  s u  and 
*
s ε .  $ γ  and 
$$ () () ss s s mJ z F z φγ γ ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦  can be obtained by first estimating a multinomial logit 
model.13 
To identify the sector choice behaviour, vector z includes information such as family 
size, household’s per capita income, community’s population density and infrastructure, 
proportions of the labourforce in agriculture and in other employment in 1989, 1991, 
and 1993. For 1997, however, we only have such information as family size, sex ratio, 
marital status, urban dummy, and certain family assets. Formally, the selection bias is 
                                                 
13 To be precise, what we should estimate is conditional logit model (see Maddala 1983). Because we 
have information only at the individual level, we use multinomial logit, which is a special version of 
the conditional logit model (Wooldridge 2002: 501).  
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caused by  s ρ , the correlation coefficient between  s u and 
*
s ε . If  s ρ =0, the results are just 
the same as that from (1), but when  0 s ρ ≠ , the results of (1) and (3) are different. 
Intuitively, when  0 s ρ ≠ , the unobservable part in the sector choice stage is correlated 
with the unobservable part at the wage determination stage. For example, high-ability 
labour may choose to work in the private sector, and high-ability workers are also 
better-educated and have higher wages. If this is the case, the return rate differentials are 
merely the result of sorting, not the results of labour market segmentation. The essence 
of switching regression or Heckman’s two stage model is using the predicted probability 
of sector choice to serve as proxy for the unobserved part in the wage equation or we 
can think of using it to absorb the unobservable part in the wage equation. So the 
coefficient of m  reflects the existence of sample selection. 
Results of switching regression 
Compared with OLS results, although the coefficients of switching regressions (panel B 
of Table 5) change to some extent, the patterns of coefficient differentials between the 
different sectors do not. The returns to education in the switching models are generally 
lower than their OLS counterparts. In 1991, the returns to education in SOEs are 1.5 per 
cent (significant at 1 per cent level), while those of others are around zero and become 
even negative (all insignificant). In 1993, the returns to education in SOEs decrease 
from 2.3 per cent in OLS to 1.7 per cent; while those of SCEs and PRI decrease to 
around zero, and on the part of SCEs even decrease to –2 per cent. Possible explanation 
is that the added parts in the switching regression represent some attributes that 
positively correlated with education. These attributes may include such factors as 
ability, family backgrounds and so on. The switching regression results of 1997 are 
similar to those of the OLS. The coefficients in the switching models change slightly 
from their OLS counterparts. One additional year of education in the private sectors 
significantly increases one’s income by 3.3 per cent, and the coefficients for other 
ownerships are about zero and insignificant.  
Experience remains significant in most of the switching regressions. Almost all the 
wage-experience profiles are inverted U shaped except for LCEs in 1993. As is 
observed in the OLS regressions, the wage-experience profiles have different shapes. In 
the early 1990s (1991 and 1993), wages increase faster in private sectors for those with 
zero year of experience than in public sectors: wages increase 3.1 per cent and 2.5 per 
cent with one additional year of experience in the private and SOE sectors, respectively 
in 1991, and 4.2 per cent and 2.1 per cent in 1993. As individual’s experience 
accumulates, the growth of wages slows down because the coefficients of experience 
squared are negative, and after a certain threshold, wage levels begin to decline. In the 
early 1990s, it takes almost 40 (results for 1993) to 60 years (results for 1991) to reach a 
peak level in SOEs, but takes about 25-30 years in the private sectors. The results for 
the SOEs during this period are at odds with the human capital theory projection, and 
this suggest that wages in the SOEs are more rigid. In 1997, however, the reverse is true. 
Wages increase faster in the SOEs than in private sectors for workers with zero 
experience, moreover, taking only about 28 years to reach the peak level. In this respect, 
wage determination in SOEs is becoming more consistent not only with human capital 
theory, but also with other ownership sectors. 
The above results indicate that the return rates of education and experience in different 
ownerships are different even when the selection bias is taken into consideration. In  
13 
fact, these results are deeply related to the rigidity of Chinese labour market, where 
labour mobility is insufficient. Free movement between sectors is not common, so there 
should not be too much change after we correct for the selection bias. 
4.2 Rural-urban  divide 
This section examines the wage determinations in rural and urban regions, respectively 
because first of all, China is a typical dual economy. The urban regions have a modern 
economy while the rural areas a relatively backward economy. In particular, the 
majority of the rural labourforce are not wage earners. And second, the reform processes 
was not simultaneous. China’s economic reform originated in rural areas in the early 
1980s, but urban reform was much later. Thus, the wage determination behaviour may 
be different. The results of the switching model are similar to those obtained with the 
OLS so only OLS results are reported. Results for 1991 are not reported either because 
they are similar to those of 1993.  
Rural regions 
In 1993, the returns to education are similar in significance, with the coefficient a little 
higher in the private and SCE sectors. The 1997 results are different. Education has 
become a critical factor in the wage determination of the private sectors, and the 
differentials in returns to education constitute one of the main differences in wage 
mechanisms of the sectors. The return to education in private sectors is 4.2 per cent 
(significant at the 5 per cent level), while those of other sectors remain insignificant, 
among which the rates of SOEs are about 1.2 per cent and of LCEs and SCEs around 
zero. The estimated wage-experience profiles are all inverted-U shaped in 1993. 
Similarly to results in previous part, wages in the private and collective-owned sectors 
increase faster and reach their peak levels earlier than in the SOEs, with the exception of 
1997 when SOEs wages increase faster and reach the peak levels earlier.  
Urban regions 
The urban labour market is quite different, with the majority of the labourforce working 
in the public sector, especially in SOEs. The share of the private sector is extremely low, 
which makes our sample size very small. But the difference in wage mechanism seems 
obvious. The OLS results indicate that in 1993, the returns to education are all above 2 
per cent, with the SOEs having the highest and only significant result. In 1997, the case 
is reversed to some extent, with the return rate in private sectors becoming the highest, 
4.0 per cent (significant at 10 per cent level), while those of SOEs, SCEs, and LCEs’ are 
-0.0 per cent, 1.4 per cent, and 1.7 per cent, respectively. As in rural area, the estimated 
wage-experience profiles are all inverted-U shaped in 1993 (except for LCE). Wages in 
private and collective-owned sectors increase faster and reach their peak levels earlier 
than the SOEs. But in 1997, it takes SOEs and private sectors nearly the same years of 
experience (23-25 years) to reach their peak. 
Taking the results of the rural and urban areas altogether, one point is worth noting: 
despite the rural-urban divide, the returns to education of the different sectors in 
different years are very similar in pattern. The reason may be that wage earners either in 
the rural or urban areas are probably working in the relatively modern sectors. So too 




Results for 1993 and 1997 (OLS) 
Dependent variable=log (hourly wage) 
 1993  1997 
  SOEs  SCEs LCEs PRIs  SOEs  SCEs LCEs PRIs 
PANEL A  RURAL 
































































R2_a  0.15  0.152 0.079 0.158  0.198 0.141 0.043 0.257 
N  367 308 168 232  469 224 117 225 

































































R2_a  0.207 0.368 0.066 0.383  0.222 0.126 0.15  0.436 
N  813 123 225  66  732 159 182 125 
Note:   Occupation and province dummies are controlled for; log form of height also controlled for in 
1993. *significant at 10% level; **significant 5% level; ***significant at 1% level. Standard errors 
in parenthesis, constant not reported. 
 
5  Sector choice and human capital allocation 
In this section, we look at the results obtained from the multinomial logit regression 
(first step of the switching model), and we expect to see the effect of education on sector 
choice and hence the allocation of human capital. In particular, we are interested in 
whether human capital is allocated to the sector where the return rates are higher. 
Without losing generality, we consider the 1997 results. First, let us examine the 
multinomial logit model, where an individuals chooses the sector based on his/her 
individual characteristics. We assume: 
1
Pr( 1 )






, which is the probability of choosing SOE,14 and  
exp( )
Pr( )












                                                 
14  The SOEs are considered as the base choice.   
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where  s=2, 3, and 4 stands for SCE, LCE, and PRI, respectively, z is a vector of 
independent variables defined in Section 4.1, and γ  is the coefficient vector. So we 
have the ratio the probability of choosing s to that of choosing 1 (SOE): 
Pr( ) Pr( 1 ) exp( ) s I sz I z z γ == = and we can next define relative risk ratio: 
Pr( ') Pr( 1 ')
exp(( ' ) )
Pr( ) Pr( 1 )
s
Is z I z
RRR z z






in particular, when the years of schooling increased one year (holding other variables 
constant),  exp(( ' ) ) exp( ) s sshooling RRR z z γγ ≡− = . When  1 RRR > , the  ratio  of the 
probability of choosing sector s to that of choosing sector 1 increase, when  1 RRR < , the 
reverse is true.  
Table 7 presents the results using all the available observations. Education is a 
significant factor in workers choosing sector (the story can also be told as follows: 
education is a significant factor when employers choose labour), with RRR<1. For 
example, the RRR (relative risk ratio) of SCE, LCE, and PRI are 0.81,15 0.85, and 0.79 
in 1997. Casually speaking, with SOEs serving as the base choice, the above results 
indicate that as education increased, the relative probability of choosing other sectors 
decreased. This regularity contradicts the fact that the return rate of education in 1997 is 
lower in the SOEs, because human capital should be allocated to the sector with the 
higher return rates, as economic theory predicts.  
Treating all available observations the same (i.e., education has the same effect on all 
individuals in choosing a sector) may be problematic, because different aged individuals 
may have different job opportunities. This consideration is indispensable in view of the 
fact that China has experienced remarkable change over the past two decades. We divide 
the whole sample into five subgroups according to age: <=25, 25~30, 30~35, 35~40, 
 
Table 7 
Ownership choice model (1997, multinomial logit) 
Dependent variable=ownership (SOE=1/SCE=2/LCE=3/PRI=4) 
 SCEs/SOEs  LCEs/SOEs  PRI/SOEs       
 Beta  RRR  Beta  RRR  Beta  RRR    Ps  R2  Obs 
A:   Full sample  -0.2053*** 0.8144  -0.1610***  0.8513  -0.2356*** 0.7901  0.2318  2176 
            
B: <=25  -0.5580*** 0.5724  -0.1973  0.821  -0.4948*** 0.6097  0.3167  345 
 25-30  -0.3168 0.7285  -0.1651  0.8478  -0.5429**  0.581  0.2943 318 
 30-35  -0.3644** 0.6946  0.0763  1.0793  -0.1589  0.8531  0.3172  373 
 35-40  0.0262 1.0265 0.1673  1.1821 0.0502 1.0515 0.4591 308 
 >40    -0.2138*** 0.8075  -0.2267***  0.7971  -0.2940*** 0.7453  0.2618  829 
Note:  We also controlled for experience, experience square, family size, gender ratio, marital status, 
urban dummy, family asset, etc., but due to space limitations, are not reported here. Constant 
and standard errors also not reported. * Significant at 10% level, ** significant 5% level, 
*** significant at 1% level. 
                                                 
15 Assume when the years of schooling are a,  r a a = (SOE) PRI)/Prob ( Prob , then when years of 
schooling are a+1,  r a a 0.81l   (SOE) PRI)/Prob ( Prob 1 1 = + + .  
16 
and above 40. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 7. The results are similar to 
Panel A: the more-educated labour education tend to choose the SOEs. For those 
younger than 25 years old, the RRR of SCEs, LCEs, and PRIs relative to SOEs are 0.57 
(significant at 1 per cent level), 0.82 and 0.61 (significant at 1 per cent level). The 
differences in magnitude and significance between PRIs-SCEs and LCEs indicate that 
the SOEs and LCEs may basically be more familiar, and this may also be true for the 
SCE and PRI sectors. The only one exception is the group of 35-40 year olds, for whom 
education is not a significant factor in the sector choice. Also, those with more years of 
schooling tend to choose the non-state sector (RRR>1).  
Briefly, individuals with more human capital tend to be allocated to the SOE sectors 
even though the return to education is lower. This may be explained by the perception 
that in the SOEs sectors, job are more decent, employees face fewer unemployment 
risks, and the fringe benefits constitute a great part of the employees’ income. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper aims to investigate the wage mechanisms in sectors that are state-owned, 
collective-owned, and private. Using CHNS data, we estimate the return to education 
and find that the return rates are different in the various sectors. This finding seems to 
be robust when we consider selection bias and the rural-urban divide. One important 
finding is that private-sector return rates to education are the highest in 1997, which 
indicates that the private sector compensates human capital more in terms of wages. We 
tend to conclude that China’s labour market is segmented at least in terms of wage 
determination. 
This paper may also have some policy implications. The fact that labour with more 
human capital tend to choose the state sector where the returns are lower indicates that 
the nature of the job may be different between the state- and non-state sectors. One 
possible reason may be the lack of such fringe benefits as social security in the private 
sectors. The case of state sector may be reversed when more weight is given to non-
wage compensation and the labourforce may lack sufficient mobility. There is 
sufficiently large space for a benevolent and efficient government to perform its duty. 
In sum, estimating wage equations is only one method of understanding China’s labour 
market, but It is only the beginning in understanding more complicated and challenging 
issues such as income distribution and inequality. This research study highlights that we 
need to give greater attention to the ownership structure of China’s economy, which is 
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